[Resource Topic] 2017/1173: Fully Verifiable Secure Delegation of Pairing Computation: Cryptanalysis and An Efficient Construction

Welcome to the resource topic for 2017/1173

Title:
Fully Verifiable Secure Delegation of Pairing Computation: Cryptanalysis and An Efficient Construction

Authors: Osmanbey Uzunkol, Öznur Kalkar, İsa Sertkaya

Abstract:

We address the problem of secure and verifiable delegation of general pairing computation. We first analyze some recently proposed pairing delegation schemes and present several attacks on their security and/or verifiability properties. In particular, we show that none of these achieve the claimed security and verifiability properties simultaneously. We then provide a fully verifiable secure delegation scheme {\sf VerPair} under one-malicious version of a two-untrusted-program model (OMTUP). {\sf VerPair} not only significantly improves the efficiency of all the previous schemes, such as fully verifiable schemes of Chevallier-Mames et al. and Canard et al. by eliminating the impractical exponentiation- and scalar-multiplication-consuming steps, but also offers for the first time the desired full verifiability property unlike other practical schemes. Furthermore, we give a more efficient and less memory consuming invocation of the subroutine {\sf Rand} for {\sf VerPair} by eliminating the requirement of offline computations of modular exponentiations and scalar-multiplications. In particular, {\sf Rand} includes a fully verifiable partial delegation under the OMTUP assumption. The partial delegation of {\sf Rand} distinguishes {\sf VerPair} as a useful lightweight delegation scheme when the delegator is resource-constrained (e.g. RFID tags, smart cards or sensor nodes).

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1173

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