[Resource Topic] 2017/057: Single--Trace Template Attack on the DES Round Keys of a Recent Smart Card

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Title:
Single–Trace Template Attack on the DES Round Keys of a Recent Smart Card

Authors: Mathias Wagner, Stefan Heyse

Abstract:

A new template attack on the DES key scheduling is demonstrated that allows recovery of a sufficiently large portion of the DES key of a recent and widely deployed smart card chip with a {\it single} EM (electromagnetic) trace during the Exploitation Phase. Depending on the use case, the remainder of the key may then be found with reasonable brute–force effort on a PC. Remaining rest entropies as low as \approx 19 bits have been found for some single–trace attacks, meaning that effectively 37 bits were recovered in a single trace. The nature of single–trace attacks has it that conventional software countermeasures are rendered useless by this attack, and thus the only remaining remedy is a hardware redesign.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/057

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