[Resource Topic] 2016/794: Message-recovery attacks on Feistel-based Format Preserving Encryption

Welcome to the resource topic for 2016/794

Title:
Message-recovery attacks on Feistel-based Format Preserving Encryption

Authors: Mihir Bellare, Viet Tung Hoang, Stefano Tessaro

Abstract:

We give attacks on Feistel-based format-preserving encryption (FPE) schemes that succeed in message recovery (not merely distinguishing scheme outputs from random) when the message space is small. For 4-bit messages, the attacks fully recover the target message using 2^{21} examples for the FF3 NIST standard and 2^{25} examples for the FF1 NIST standard. The examples include only three messages per tweak, which is what makes the attacks non-trivial even though the total number of examples exceeds the size of the domain. The attacks are rigorously analyzed in a new definitional framework of message-recovery security. The attacks are easily put out of reach by increasing the number of Feistel rounds in the standards.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/794

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