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Title:
Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation to Prevent Heap Overflow Attacks
Authors: Alexandra Boldyreva, Taesoo Kim, Richard Lipton, Bogdan Warinschi
Abstract:We initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs that detect the presence of injected malicious code in remotely- stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formal security definitions are general enough to cover a wide range of attacks and settings, and should be useful for further research on the subject.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/729
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