Welcome to the resource topic for 2015/365
Title:
On the (im)possibility of receiving security beyond 2^l using an l-bit PRNG: the case of Wang et. al. protocol
Authors: Masoumeh Safkhani, Mehdi Hosseinzadeh, Mojtaba Eslamnezhad Namin, Samad Rostampour, Nasour Bagheri
Abstract:Recently,Wang et al. analyzed the security of two EPC C1-G2 compliant RFID authentication protocols, called RAPLT and SRP^+, and proved that these protocols are vulnerable against de-synchronization and secret disclosure attacks. The time complexity of their attacks were O(2^{16}). In addition, they proposed an improved version of SRP^+ entitled SRP^{++}, for which they claim the security would be O(2^{32}). However, in this letter, we analyze the security of SRP^{++} and show that the complexity of retrieving all secret parameters of a given tag is O(2^{16}), similar to its predecessor protocol.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/365
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