[Resource Topic] 2014/854: Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs

Welcome to the resource topic for 2014/854

Title:
Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs

Authors: Pei Luo, Yunsi Fei, Xin Fang, A. Adam Ding, Miriam Leeser, David R. Kaeli

Abstract:

Keccak is the hash function selected by NIST as the new SHA-3 standard. Keccak is built on Sponge construction and it provides a new MAC function called MAC-Keccak. These new algorithms have raised questions with regards to side-channel leakage and analysis attacks of MAC-Keccak. So far there exists prior work on attacks of software implementations of MAC-Keccak, but there has been no comprehensive side-channel vulnerability assessment of its hardware implementation. In this paper we describe an attack on the \theta step of the first round of MAC-Keccak implemented on an FPGA. We construct several different side-channel leakage models and implement attacks based on them. Our work shows that an unmasked hardware implementation of SHA-3 is vulnerable to power-based side-channel attacks.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/854

See all topics related to this paper.

Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.

Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.

For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .