[Resource Topic] 2014/759: How to Efficiently Evaluate RAM Programs with Malicious Security

Welcome to the resource topic for 2014/759

Title:
How to Efficiently Evaluate RAM Programs with Malicious Security

Authors: Arash Afshar, Zhangxiang Hu, Payman Mohassel, Mike Rosulek

Abstract:

Secure 2-party computation (2PC) is becoming practical for some applications. However, most approaches are limited by the fact that the desired functionality must be represented as a boolean circuit. In response, random-access machines (RAM programs) have recently been investigated as a promising alternative representation. In this work, we present the first practical protocols for evaluating RAM programs with security against malicious adversaries. A useful efficiency measure is to divide the cost of malicious-secure evaluation of f by the cost of semi-honest-secure evaluation of f. Our RAM protocols achieve ratios matching the state of the art for circuit-based 2PC. For statistical security 2^{-s}, our protocol without preprocessing achieves a ratio of s; our online-offline protocol has a pre-processing phase and achieves online ratio \sim 2 s / \log T, where T is the total execution time of the RAM program. To summarize, our solutions show that the ``extra overhead" of obtaining malicious security for RAM programs (beyond what is needed for circuits) is minimal and does not grow with the running time of the program.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/759

See all topics related to this paper.

Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.

Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.

For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .