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Title:
A practical state recovery attack on the stream cipher Sablier v1
Authors: Xiutao FENG, Fan ZHANG
Abstract:Sablier is an authenticated encryption cipher submitted to the CAESAR competition, which is composed of the encryption Sablier v1 and the authentication \textup{Au}. In this work we present a state recovery attack against the encryption Sablier v1 with time complexity about 2^{44} operations and data complexity about 24 of 16-bit keywords. Our attack is practical in the workstation. It is noticed that the update of the internal state of Sablier v1 is invertible, thus our attack can further deduce a key recovery attack and a forgery attack against the authenticated encryption Sablier. The result shows that Sablier v1 is far from the goal of its security design (80-bit level).
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/245
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