Welcome to the resource topic for 2013/531
Title:
On the Limits of Provable Anonymity
Authors: Nethanel Gelernter, Amir Herzberg
Abstract:We study provably secure anonymity, focusing on ultimate anonymity - strongest-possible anonymity requirements and adversaries. We begin with rigorous definition of anonymity against wide range of computationally-bounded attackers, including eavesdroppers, malicious peers, malicious destina-tions, and their combinations. Following the work of Hevia and Micciancio [15], our definition is generic, and captures different notions of anonymity (e.g., unobservability and sender anonymity). We then study the feasibility of ultimate anonymity. We show there is a protocol satisfying this requirement, but with absurd (although polynomial) inefficiency and overhead. We show that such inefficiency and overhead is unavoidable for `ultimate anonymity’. We then present a slightly-relaxed requirement and present feasible protocols for it.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/531
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