Welcome to the resource topic for 2013/346
Title:
Using Bleichenbacher’s Solution to the Hidden Number Problem to Attack Nonce Leaks in 384-Bit ECDSA
Authors: Elke De Mulder, Michael Hutter, Mark E. Marson, Peter Pearson
Abstract:In this paper we describe an attack against nonce leaks in 384-bit ECDSA using an FFT-based attack due to Bleichenbacher. The signatures were computed by a modern smart card. We extracted the low-order bits of each nonce using a template-based power analysis attack against the modular inversion of the nonce. We also developed a BKZ-based method for the range reduction phase of the attack, as it was impractical to collect enough signatures for the collision searches originally used by Bleichenbacher. We confirmed our attack by extracting the entire signing key using a 5-bit nonce leak from 4000 signatures.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/346
See all topics related to this paper.
Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.
Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.
For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .