Welcome to the resource topic for 2013/309
Title:
Bypassing Passkey Authentication in Bluetooth Low Energy
Authors: Tomas Rosa
Abstract:This memo describes new cryptographic weakness of the passkey-based pairing of Bluetooth Low Energy (also known as Bluetooth Smart). The vulnerability discussed here extends the set of possible attacking scenarios that were already elaborated before by Mike Ryan at Shmoocon 2013. Instead of the passive sniffing attack on pairing secrets, we show how an active fraudulent Responder can gracefully bypass passkey authentication, despite it being possibly based on even one-time generated PIN.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/309
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