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Title:
Improved Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced Version of Camellia-192/256
Authors: Ya Liu, Dawu Gu, Zhiqiang Liu, Wei Li
Abstract:As an ISO/IEC international standard, Camellia has been used various cryptographic applications. In this paper, we improve previous attacks on Camellia-192/256 with key-dependent layers FL/FL^{-1} by using the intrinsic weakness of keyed functions. Specifically, we present the first impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia with 2^{121.6} chosen ciphertexts and 2^{189.9} 13-round encryptions, while the analysis for the biggest number of rounds in previous results on Camellia-192 worked on 12 rounds. Furthermore, we successfully attack 14-round Camellia-256 with 2^{122.1} chosen ciphertexts and 2^{229.3} 14-round encryptions. Compared with the previously best known attack on 14-round Camellia-256, the time complexity of our attack is reduced by 2^{8.9} times and the data complexity is comparable.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/594
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