Welcome to the resource topic for 2011/671
Title:
Improved Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Camellia-192/256
Authors: Ya Liu, Dawu Gu, Zhiqiang Liu, Wei Li, Ying Man
Abstract:As an international standard adopted by ISO/IEC, the block cipher Camellia has been used in various cryptographic applications. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of Camellia against impossible differential cryptanalysis. Specifically, we propose several 7-round impossible differentials with the FL/FL^{-1} layers. Based on them, we mount impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256. The data complexities of our attacks on 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256 are about 2^{120} chosen plaintexts and 2^{119.8} chosen plaintexts, respectively. The corresponding time complexities are approximately 2^{167.1} 11-round encryptions and 2^{220.87} 12-round encryptions. As far as we know, our attacks are 2^{16.9} times and 2^{19.13} times faster than the previously best known ones but have slightly more data.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/671
See all topics related to this paper.
Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.
Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.
For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .