[Resource Topic] 2011/581: Standard Security Does Not Imply Security Against Selective-Opening

Welcome to the resource topic for 2011/581

Title:
Standard Security Does Not Imply Security Against Selective-Opening

Authors: Mihir Bellare, Rafael Dowsley, Brent Waters, Scott Yilek

Abstract:

We show that no commitment scheme that is hiding and binding according to the standard definition is semantically-secure under selective opening attack (SOA), resolving a long-standing and fundamental open question about the power of SOAs. We also obtain the first examples of IND-CPA encryption schemes that are not secure under SOA, both for sender corruptions where encryption coins are revealed and receiver corruptions where decryption keys are revealed. These results assume only the existence of collision-resistant hash functions.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/581

Talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XrpVX698hT8

Slides: https://iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2012/EUROCRYPT/presentation/24251.pptx

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