[Resource Topic] 2011/287: Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48

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Title:
Algebraic cryptanalysis of the round-reduced and side channel analysis of the full PRINTCipher-48

Authors: Stanislav Bulygin

Abstract:

In this paper we analyze the recently proposed light-weight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 with only 2 known plaintexts and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity. We investigate applicability of our method to cryptanalysis of the full PRINTCipher-48.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/287

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