Welcome to the resource topic for 2011/252
Title:
Cryptography Secure Against Related-Key Attacks and Tampering
Authors: Mihir Bellare, David Cash, Rachel Miller
Abstract:We show how to leverage the RKA (Related-Key Attack) security of blockciphers to provide RKA security for a suite of high-level primitives. This motivates a more general theoretical question, namely, when is it possible to transfer RKA security from a primitive P1 to a primitive P2? We provide both positive and negative answers. What emerges is a broad and high level picture of the way achievability of RKA security varies across primitives, showing, in particular, that some primitives resist more'' RKAs than others. A technical challenge was to achieve RKA security even for the practical classes of related-key deriving (RKD) functions underlying fault injection attacks that fail to satisfy the claw-freeness’’ assumption made in previous works. We surmount this barrier for the first time based on the construction of PRGs that are not only RKA secure but satisfy a new notion of identity-collision-resistance.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/252
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