Welcome to the resource topic for 2011/165
Title:
Improved Side Channel Cube Attacks on PRESENT
Authors: XinJie Zhao, Tao Wang, ShiZe Guo
Abstract:The paper presents several improved side channel cube attacks on PRESENT based on single bit leakage model. Compared with the previous study of Yang et al in CANS 2009 [30], based on the same model of single bit leakage in the 3rd round, we show that: if the PRESENT cipher structure is unknown, for the leakage bit 0, 32-bit key can be recovered within 2^{7.17} chosen plaintexts; if the cipher structure is known, for the leakage bit 4,8,12, 48-bit key can be extracted by 2^{11.92} chosen plaintexts, which is less than 2^{15} in [30]; then, we extend the single bit leakage model to the 4th round, based on the two level “divide and conquer” analysis strategy, we propose a sliding window side channel cube attack on PRESENT, for the leakage bit 0, about 2^{15.14} chosen plaintexts can obtain 60-bit key; in order to obtain more key bits, we propose an iterated side channel cube attack on PRESENT, about 2^{8.15} chosen plaintexts can obtain extra 12 equivalent key bits, so overall 2^{15.154} chosen plaintexts can reduce the PRESENT-80 key searching space to 2^{8}; finally, we extend the attack to PRESENT-128, about 2^{15.156} chosen plaintexts can extract 85 bits key, and reduce the PRESENT-128 key searching space to 2^{43}. Compared with the previous study of Abdul-Latip et al in ASIACCS 2011 [31] based on the Hamming weight leakage model, which can extract 64-bit key of PRESENT-80/128 by 2^{13} chosen plaintexts, our attacks can extract more key bits, and have certain advantages over [31].
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/165
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