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Title:
A Full Proof of the BGW Protocol for Perfectly-Secure Multiparty Computation
Authors: Gilad Asharov and Yehuda Lindell
Abstract:In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of n parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some functionality of their inputs. One of the most fundamental results of secure computation was presented by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson (BGW) in 1988. They demonstrated that any n-party functionality can be computed with \emph{perfect security}, in the private channels model. When the adversary is semi-honest this holds as long as t<n/2 parties are corrupted, and when the adversary is malicious this holds as long as t<n/3 parties are corrupted. Unfortunately, a full proof of these results was never published. In this paper, we remedy this situation and provide a full proof of security of the BGW protocol. This includes a full description of the protocol for the malicious setting, including the construction of a new subprotocol for the perfect multiplication protocol that seems necessary for the case of n/4\leq t<n/3.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/136
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