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Title:
Can Code Polymorphism Limit Information Leakage?
Authors: Antoine Amarilli, Sascha Müller, David Naccache, Daniel Page, Pablo Rauzy, Michael Tunstall
Abstract:In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As one can easily imagine, real-life devices are not ideal and information may leak through different physical side-channels. It is a known fact that information leakage is a function of both the executed code F and its input x.\smallskip In this work we explore the use of polymorphic code as a way of resisting side channel attacks. We present experimental results with procedural and functional languages. In each case we rewrite the protected code code F_i before its execution. The outcome is a genealogy of programs F_0,F_1,\ldots such that for all inputs x and for all indexes i \neq j \Rightarrow F_i(x)=F_j(x)\mbox{~and~}F_i\neq F_j. This is shown to increase resistance to side channel attacks.\smallskip
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/099
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