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Title:
No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method
Authors: Dima Grigoriev, Vladimir Shpilrain
Abstract:We propose a class of authentication schemes that are literally zero-knowledge, as compared to what is formally defined as zero-knowledge" in cryptographic literature. We call this no-leak" authentication to distinguish from an established zero-knowledge" concept. The no-leak" condition implies zero-knowledge" (even perfect zero-knowledge"), but it is actually stronger, as we illustrate by examples. The principal idea behind our schemes is: the verifier challenges the prover with questions that he (the verifier) already knows answers to; therefore, even a computationally unbounded verifier who follows the protocol cannot possibly learn anything new during any number of authentication sessions. This is therefore also true for a computationally unbounded passive adversary.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/624
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