[Resource Topic] 2010/404: On the Insecurity of Parallel Repetition for Leakage Resilience

Welcome to the resource topic for 2010/404

Title:
On the Insecurity of Parallel Repetition for Leakage Resilience

Authors: Allison Lewko, Brent Waters

Abstract:

A fundamental question in leakage-resilient cryptography is: can leakage resilience always be amplified by parallel repetition? It is natural to expect that if we have a leakage-resilient primitive tolerating \ell bits of leakage, we can take n copies of it to form a system tolerating n\ell bits of leakage. In this paper, we show that this is not always true. We construct a public key encryption system which is secure when at most \ell bits are leaked, but if we take n copies of the system and encrypt a share of the message under each using an n-out-of-n secret-sharing scheme, leaking n\ell bits renders the system insecure. Our results hold either in composite order bilinear groups under a variant of the subgroup decision assumption \emph{or} in prime order bilinear groups under the decisional linear assumption. We note that the n copies of our public key systems share a common reference parameter.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/404

See all topics related to this paper.

Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.

Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.

For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .