[Resource Topic] 2009/500: Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci

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Title:
Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci

Authors: Nils Reimers

Abstract:

This paper shows a key recovery attack on QuiSci (quick stream cipher), designed by Stefan Müller (FGAN-FHR, a German research institute) in 2001. With one or few know plaintexts it’s possible to recover most of the key with negligible time complexity. This paper shows a way how to exploit the weak key setup of QuiSci.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/500

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