Welcome to the resource topic for 2009/282
Title:
Leakage-Resilient Signatures
Authors: Sebastian Faust, Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Guy Rothblum
Abstract:The strongest standard security notion for digital signature schemes is unforgeability under chosen message attacks. In practice, however, this notion can be insufficient due to side-channel attacks'' which exploit leakage of information about the secret internal state of the scheme's hardware implementation. In this work we put forward the notion of leakage-resilient signatures,‘’ which strengthens the standard security notion by giving the adversary the additional power to learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the secret state that was accessed during every signature generation. This notion naturally implies security against all possible side-channel attacks as long as the amount of information leaked on each invocation is bounded and ``only computation leaks information.‘’ The main result of this paper is a construction which gives a (tree based, stateful) leakage-resilient signature scheme based on any 3-time signature scheme. The amount of information that our scheme can safely leak per signature generation is 1/3 of the information the underlying 3-time signature scheme can leak in total. Based on recent works by Alwen, Dodis, Wichs and by Katz we give several efficient instantiations of 3-time signature schemes with the required security properties, hence yielding the first constructions of provably secure leakage-resilient signature schemes.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/282
See all topics related to this paper.
Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.
Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.
For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .