[Resource Topic] 2009/054: On the Security of Tandem-DM

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Title:
On the Security of Tandem-DM

Authors: Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks

Abstract:

We provide the first proof of security for Tandem-DM one of the oldest and most well-known constructions for turning a blockcipher with n-bit blocklength and 2n-bit keylength into a 2n-bit cryptographic hash function. We prove, that when Tandem-DM is instantiated with AES-256, i.e. blocklength 128 bits and keylength 256 bits, any adversary that asks less than 2^{120.4} queries cannot find a collision with success probability greater than 1/2. We also prove a bound for preimage resistance of Tandem-DM. Interestingly, as there is only one practical construction known (FSE’06, Hirose) turning such an (n,2n)-bit blockcipher into a 2n-bit compression function that has provably birthday-type collision resistance, Tandem-DM is one out of two structures that possess this desirable feature.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/054

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