[Resource Topic] 2009/044: Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB

Welcome to the resource topic for 2009/044

Title:
Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB

Authors: Dmitry Frumkin, Adi Shamir

Abstract:

With increased use of passive RFID tags, the need for secure lightweight identification protocols arose. HB+ is one such protocol, which was proven secure in the detection-based model, but shown breakable by man-in-the-middle attacks. Trusted-HB is a variant of HB+, specifically designed to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we discuss several weaknesses of Trusted-HB, show that the formal security proof provided by its designers is incorrect, and demonstrate how to break it in realistic scenarios.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/044

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