[Resource Topic] 2009/005: Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Pelican, MT-MAC-AES and PC-MAC-AES

Welcome to the resource topic for 2009/005

Title:
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Pelican, MT-MAC-AES and PC-MAC-AES

Authors: Wei Wang, Xiaoyun Wang, Guangwu Xu

Abstract:

In this paper, the impossible differential cryptanalysis is extended to MAC algorithms \textsc{Pelican}, MT-MAC and PC-MAC based on AES and 4-round AES. First, we collect message pairs that produce the inner near-collision with some specific differences by the birthday attack. Then the impossible differential attack on 4-round AES is implemented using a 3-round impossible differential property. For \textsc{Pelican}, our attack can recover the internal state, which is an equivalent subkey. For MT-MAC-AES, the attack turns out to be a subkey recovery attack directly. The data complexity of the two attacks is 2^{85.5} chosen messages, and the time complexity is about 2^{85.5} queries. For PC-MAC-AES, we can recover the 256-bit key with 2^{85.5} chosen messages and 2^{128} queries.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/005

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