[Resource Topic] 2008/241: Practical Attacks on HB and HB+ Protocols

Welcome to the resource topic for 2008/241

Title:
Practical Attacks on HB and HB+ Protocols

Authors: Zbigniew Golebiewski, Krzysztof Majcher, Filip Zagorski, Marcin Zawada

Abstract:

HB and HB+ are a shared-key authentication protocol designed for low-cost devices such as RFID tags. It was proposed by Juels and Weis at Crypto 2005. The security of the protocol relies on the ``learning parity with noise’’ (LPN) problem, which was proved to be NP-hard. The best known attack on LPN (by Levieil and Fouque, SCN 2006) requires exponential number of samples and exponential number of operations to be performed. This makes this attack impractical because it is infeasible to collect exponentially-many observations of the protocol execution. We present a passive attack on HB protocol which requires only linear (to the length of the secret key) number of samples. Number of performed operations is still exponential, but attack is efficient for some real-life values of the parameters, i.~e.~noise \frac{1}{8} and key length 144-bits.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/241

See all topics related to this paper.

Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.

Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.

For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .