Welcome to the resource topic for
**2006/155**

**Title:**

Independent Zero-Knowledge Sets

**Authors:**
Rosario Gennaro, Silvio Micali

**Abstract:**

We define and construct Independent Zero-Knowledge Sets (ZKS) protocols. In a ZKS protocols, a Prover commits to a set S, and for any x, proves non-interactively to a Verifier if x \in S or x \notin S without revealing any other information about S.

In the {\em independent} ZKS protocols we introduce, the adversary is

prevented from successfully correlate her set to the one of a honest prover. Our notion of independence in particular implies that the

resulting ZKS protocol is non-malleable.

On the way to this result we define the notion of {\em independence} for commitment schemes. It is shown that this notion implies non-malleability, and we argue that this new notion has the potential to

simplify the design and security proof of non-malleable commitment schemes.

Efficient implementations of ZKS protocols are based on the notion of mercurial commitments. Our efficient constructions of independent

ZKS protocols requires the design of {\em new} commitment schemes that are simultaneously independent (and thus non-malleable) and mercurial.

**ePrint:**
https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/155

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