[Resource Topic] 2006/088: On the Feasibility of Consistent Computations

Welcome to the resource topic for 2006/088

On the Feasibility of Consistent Computations

Authors: Sven Laur, Helger Lipmaa


In many practical settings, participants are willing to deviate from
the protocol only if they remain undetected. Aumann and Lindell
introduced a concept of covert adversaries to formalize this type of
corruption. In the current paper, we refine their model to get
stronger security guarantees. Namely, we show how to construct
protocols, where malicious participants cannot learn anything beyond
their intended outputs and honest participants can detect malicious
behavior that alters their outputs. As this construction does not
protect honest parties from selective protocol failures, a valid
corruption complaint can leak a single bit of information about the
inputs of honest parties. Importantly, it is often up to the honest
party to decide whether to complain or not. This potential leakage
is often compensated by gains in efficiency—many standard
zero-knowledge proof steps can be omitted. As a concrete practical
contribution, we show how to implement consistent versions of
several important cryptographic protocols such as oblivious
transfer, conditional disclosure of secrets and private inference

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/088

Talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqjU-fCgnTk

Slides: http://www.iacr.org/workshops/pkc2010/06_on_the_feasibility_of_consistent_computations/

See all topics related to this paper.

Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.

Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.

For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .