[Resource Topic] 2006/047: Cryptographically Sound Theorem Proving

Welcome to the resource topic for 2006/047

Cryptographically Sound Theorem Proving

Authors: Christoph Sprenger, Michael Backes, David Basin, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner


We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes,
Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
This model is cryptographically sound in the strong sense of reactive
simulatability/UC, which essentially entails the preservation of
arbitrary security properties under active attacks and in arbitrary
protocol environments. The main challenge in designing a practical
formalization of this model is to cope with the complexity of
providing such strong soundness guarantees. We reduce this complexity
by abstracting the model into a sound, light-weight formalization that
enables both concise property specifications and efficient application
of our proof strategies and their supporting proof tools. This yields
the first tool-supported framework for symbolically verifying security
protocols that enjoys the strong cryptographic soundness guarantees
provided by reactive simulatability/UC. As a proof of concept, we have
proved the security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol using our

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/047

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