[Resource Topic] 2005/468: Blind Attacks on Engineering Samples

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Blind Attacks on Engineering Samples

Authors: Vanessa Gratzer, David Naccache


In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography
silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a
single location. As we now know, real-life devices are
not ideal and confidential information leaks through different physical

Whilst most aspects of side channel leakage (cryptophthora)
are now well understood, no attacks on totally unknown algorithms
are known to date. This paper describes such an attack.\smallskip

By {\sl totally unknown} we mean that no
information on the algorithm’s mathematical description (including the plaintext
the microprocessor or the chip’s power consumption model is available to the attacker.\smallskip

We successfully experimented the attack on a commercially available device produced by a
non-European smart-card manufacturer.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/468

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