Welcome to the resource topic for 2005/220
Title:
Limits of the Cryptographic Realization of Dolev-Yao-style XOR
Authors: Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann
Abstract:The abstraction of cryptographic operations by term algebras, called
Dolev-Yao models, is essential in almost all tool-supported methods
for proving security protocols. Recently significant progress was made
in proving that such abstractions can be sound with respect to actual
cryptographic realizations and security definitions. The strongest
results show this in the sense of reactive simulatability/UC, a notion
that essentially means retention of arbitrary security properties
under arbitrary active attacks and in arbitrary protocol environments,
with only small changes to both abstractions and natural
implementations.
However, these results are so far restricted to cryptographic systems
like encryption and signatures which essentially only have
constructors and destructors, but no further algebraic
properties. Typical modern tools and complexity results around
Dolev-Yao models also allow more algebraic operations. The first such
operation considered is typically XOR because of its clear structure
and cryptographic usefulness. We show that it is impossible to extend
the strong soundness results to XOR, at least not with remotely the
same generality and naturalness as for the core cryptographic
systems. On the positive side, we show the soundness of an XOR model
and realization under passive attacks.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/220
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