Welcome to the resource topic for 2005/147
Tamper-Evident Digital Signatures: Protecting Certification Authorities Against Malware
Authors: Jong Youl Choi, Philippe Golle, Markus JakobssonAbstract:
We introduce the notion of tamper-evidence for digital signature generation in order to
defend against attacks aimed at covertly leaking secret information held by corrupted network nodes.
This is achieved by letting observers (which need not be trusted) verify the absence of covert channels
by means of techniques we introduce herein. We call our signature schemes tamper-evident since any
deviation from the protocol is immediately detectable. We demonstrate our technique for RSA-PSS and
DSA signature schemes and how the same technique can be applied to Feige-Fiat-Shamir (FFS) and
Schnorr signature schemes. Our technique does not modify the distribution of the generated signature
transcripts, and has only a minimal overhead in terms of computation, communication, and storage.
Keywords. covert channel, malware, observer, subliminal channel, tamper-evident, undercover
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