Welcome to the resource topic for 2005/098
Title:
Probabilistic Opacity for a Passive Adversary and its Application to Chaum’s Voting Scheme
Authors: Yassine Lakhnech, Laurent Mazare
Abstract:A predicate is opaque for a given system, if an adversary will never
be able to establish truth or falsehood of the predicate for any
observed computation. This notion has been essentially introduced and
studied in the context of transition systems whether describing the
semantics of programs, security protocols or other systems. In this
paper, we are interested in studying opacity in the probabilistic
computational world.
Indeed, in other settings, as in the Dolev-Yao model for instance, even
if an adversary is 99\% sure of the truth of the predicate, it
remains opaque as the adversary cannot conclude for sure.
In this paper, we introduce a computational version of opacity in the case of
passive adversaries called cryptographic opacity.
Our main result is a composition theorem: if a system is secure in an
abstract formalism and the cryptographic primitives used to implement
it are secure, then this system is secure in a
computational formalism. Security of the abstract system is the usual
opacity and security of the cryptographic primitives is IND-CPA security.
To illustrate our result, we give two applications:
a short and elegant proof of the classical Abadi-Rogaway result and
the first computational proof of Chaum’s visual electronic
voting scheme.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/098
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