Welcome to the resource topic for 2005/097
Title:
Computationally Sound Verification of Security Protocols Using Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation
Authors: Yassine Lakhnech, Laurent Mazare
Abstract:Recently, it has been proved that computational security can
be automatically verified using the Dolev-Yao abstraction. We extend
these results by adding a widely used component for cryptographic
protocols: Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. Thus our main result is: if
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption is verified and the
cryptographic primitives used to implement the protocol are secure,
then safety in the symbolic world implies safety in the computational
world. Therefore, it is possible to prove automatically safety in the
computational world.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/097
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