[Resource Topic] 2004/290: The Security of the FDH Variant of Chaum's Undeniable Signature Scheme

Welcome to the resource topic for 2004/290

Title:
The Security of the FDH Variant of Chaum’s Undeniable Signature Scheme

Authors: Wakaha Ogata, Kaoru Kurosawa, Swee-Huay Heng

Abstract:

In this paper,
we first introduce a new kind of adversarial goal
called {\em forge-and-impersonate} in
undeniable signature schemes.
Note that
forgeability does not necessarily imply impersonation ability.
We then classify the security of the FDH
variant of Chaum’s undeniable signature scheme
according to three dimensions,
the goal of adversaries, the attacks
and the ZK level of confirmation and disavowal protocols.
We finally relate each security to some
well-known computational problem.
In particular,
we prove that the security of the FDH variant of Chaum’s scheme with
NIZK confirmation and disavowal protocols
is equivalent to the CDH problem,
as opposed to the GDH problem
as claimed by Okamoto and Pointcheval.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/290

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