Welcome to the resource topic for 2004/182
Title:
Simpler Session-Key Generation from Short Random Passwords
Authors: Minh-Huyen Nguyen, Salil Vadhan
Abstract:Goldreich and Lindell (CRYPTO `01) recently presented the first protocol for
password-authenticated key exchange in the standard model (with no common reference string
or set-up assumptions other than the shared password). However, their protocol uses several
heavy tools and has a complicated analysis.
We present a simplification of the Goldreich–Lindell (GL) protocol and analysis for the
special case when the dictionary is of the form D=\{0,1\}^d, i.e. the password is a
short random string (like an ATM PIN number). Our protocol can be converted into one
for arbitrary dictionaries using a common reference string of logarithmic length. The
security bound achieved by our protocol is somewhat worse than the GL protocol. Roughly
speaking, our protocol guarantees that the adversary can ``break’’ the scheme with
probability at most O(\mathrm{poly}(n)/|D|)^{\Omega(1)}, whereas the GL protocol
guarantees a bound of O(1/|D|).
We also present an alternative, more natural definition of security than the ``augmented
definition’’ of Goldreich and Lindell, and prove that the two definitions are equivalent.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/182
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