[Resource Topic] 2004/101: Provably Secure Masking of AES

Welcome to the resource topic for 2004/101

Title:
Provably Secure Masking of AES

Authors: Johannes Blömer, Jorge Guajardo Merchan, Volker Krummel

Abstract:

A general method to
secure cryptographic algorithm implementations against side-channel
attacks is the use of randomization techniques and, in particular,
masking. Roughly speaking, using random values unknown to an adversary
one masks the input to a cryptographic algorithm. As a result, the
intermediate results in the algorithm computation are uncorrelated to
the input and the adversary cannot obtain any useful information from
the side-channel. Unfortunately, previous AES randomization techniques
have based their security on heuristics and experiments. Thus, flaws
have been found which make AES randomized implementations still
vulnerable to side-channel cryptanalysis. In this paper, we provide a
formal notion of security for randomized maskings of arbitrary
cryptographic algorithms.
Furthermore, we present an AES randomization technique
that is provably secure against side-channel attacks if the adversary
is able to access a single intermediate result. Our randomized masking technique is quite general
and it can be applied to arbitrary algorithms using only arithmetic
operations over some even characteristic finite field. We notice
that to our knowledge this is the first time that a randomization
technique for the AES has been proven secure in a formal model.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/101

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