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A Cryptanalysis of the Original Domingo-Ferrer’s Algebraic Privacy Homomophism
Authors: Jung Hee Cheon, Hyun Soo NamAbstract:
We propose a cryptanalysis of the original Domingo-Ferrer’s algebraic privacy homomorphism. We show that the scheme over \Z_n can be broken by d+1 known plaintexts in O(d^3\log^2 n) time when it has d times expansion through the encryption. Furthermore even when the public modulus n is kept secret, it can be broken by d+2 known plaintexts in time at most O(d^5\log^2(dn)).
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