[Resource Topic] 2003/135: Collision Attack on Reduced-Round Camellia

Welcome to the resource topic for 2003/135

Title:
Collision Attack on Reduced-Round Camellia

Authors: Wen-Ling Wu, Deng-Guo Feng

Abstract:

Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we construct some efficient distinguishers between 4-round Camellia and a random permutation of the blocks space. By using collision-searching techniques, the distinguishers are used to attack on 6,7,8 and 9 rounds of Camellia with 128-bit key and 8,9 and 10 rounds of Camellia with 192/256-bit key. The 128-bit key of 6 rounds
Camellia can be recovered with 2^{10} chosen plaintexts and
2^{15} encryptions. The 128-bit key of 7 rounds Camellia can be
recovered with 2^{12} chosen plaintexts and 2^{54.5} encryptions. The 128-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2^{13} chosen plaintexts and 2^{112.1} encryptions. The 128-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2^{113.6} chosen plaintexts and 2^{121} encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2^{13} chosen plaintexts and 2^{111.1} encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2^{13} chosen plaintexts and 2^{175.6} encryptions.The 256-bit key of 10 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2^{14} chosen plaintexts and 2^{239.9} encryptions.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/135

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