[Resource Topic] 2003/129: Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC'03

Welcome to the resource topic for 2003/129

Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC’03

Authors: Fangguo Zhang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Willy Susilo


At the fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
(EC’03), S. Han, K.Y. Yeung and J. Wang proposed an ID-based
confirmer signature scheme using pairings (actually, this is an
ID-based undeniable signature scheme). However, in this paper, we
will show that this signature scheme is not secure. The signer can
deny any signature, even this signature is his valid signature and
any one can forge a valid confirmer signature of a signer with
identity ID on an arbitrary message and confirm this signature to
the verifier.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/129

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