Welcome to the resource topic for 2003/121
Title:
A Cryptographically Sound Security Proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key Protocol
Authors: Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann
Abstract:We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the
well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol. More precisely,
we show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active attacks
if it is implemented using provably secure cryptographic primitives.
Although we achieve security under cryptographic definitions, our
proof does not have to deal with probabilistic aspects of cryptography
and is hence in the scope of current proof tools. The reason is that
we exploit a recently proposed ideal cryptographic library, which has
a provably secure cryptographic implementation. Besides establishing
the cryptographic security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, our
result also exemplifies the potential of this cryptographic library
and paves the way for cryptographically sound verification of security
protocols by means of formal proof tools.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/121
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