[Resource Topic] 2003/082: Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC

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Title:
Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC

Authors: Tetsu Iwata, Kaoru Kurosawa

Abstract:

OMAC, TMAC and XCBC are CBC-type MAC schemes which are provably secure for arbitrary message length. In this paper, we present a more tight upper bound on {\tt Adv}^{\sf mac} for each scheme,
where {\tt Adv}^{\sf mac} denotes the maximum success (forgery) probability of adversaries. Our bounds are expressed in terms of
the \textit{total length} of all queries of an adversary to the MAC generation oracle while the previous bounds are expressed in terms of the \textit{maximum length} of each query. In particular, a significant improvement occurs if the lengths of queries are heavily unbalanced.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/082

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