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On Modeling IND-CCA Security in Cryptographic Protocols
Authors: Dennis Hofheinz, Joern Mueller-Quade, Rainer SteinwandtAbstract:
Two common notions of security for public key encryption schemes are shown to be equivalent: we prove that indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is in fact polynomially equivalent to (yet “slightly” weaker than) securely realizing the ideal functionality F_PKE in the general modeling of cryptographic protocols of [Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols]. This disproves in particular the claim that security in the sense of IND-CCA strictly implies security in the sense of realizing F_PKE (see [Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols]). Moreover, we give concrete reductions among such security notions and show that these relations hold for both uniform and non-uniform adversarial entities.
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