Welcome to the resource topic for 2002/183
Title:
Simple backdoors to RSA key generation
Authors: Claude Crépeau, Alain Slakmon
Abstract:We present extremely simple ways of embedding a backdoor in the key
generation scheme of RSA. Three of our schemes generate two
genuinely random primes p and q of a given size, to obtain their
public product n=pq. However they generate private/public
exponents pairs (d,e) in such a way that appears very random while
allowing the author of the scheme to easily factor n given only
the public information (n,e). Our last scheme, similar to the PAP
method of Young and Yung, but more secure, works for any public
exponent e such as 3,17,65537 by revealing the factorization of
n in its own representation. This suggests that nobody should
rely on RSA key generation schemes provided by a third party.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/183
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