Welcome to the resource topic for 2002/169
Title:
Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel
Authors: D. Page
Abstract:We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al, of cache memory being
used as a side-channel which leaks information during the run of a
cryptographic algorithm. By using this side-channel, an attacker may
be able to reveal or narrow the possible values of secret information
held on the target device. We describe an attack which encrypts
2^{10} chosen plaintexts on the target processor in order to collect
cache profiles and then performs around 2^{32} computational steps
to recover the key. As well as describing and simulating the
theoretical attack, we discuss how hardware and algorithmic
alterations can be used to defend against such techniques.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/169
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