Welcome to the resource topic for 2002/165
Title:
Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections
Authors: Ari Juels, Dario Catalano, Markus Jakobsson
Abstract:We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves
a more powerful adversary than in previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme to be coercion-resistant
if it is infeasible for the adversary to determine whether
a coerced voter complies with the demands.
A first contribution of this paper is to describe and characterize a
new and strengthened adversary for coercion in elections. (In doing
so, we additionally present what we believe to be the first formal
security definitions for electronic elections of any type.) A
second contribution is to demonstrate a protocol that is secure
against this adversary. While it is clear that a strengthening of
attack models is of theoretical relevance, it is important to note
that our results lie close to practicality. This is true both in that
we model real-life threats (such as vote-buying and vote-cancelling),
and in that our proposed protocol combines a fair degree of efficiency
with an unusual lack of structural complexity. Furthermore, while
previous schemes have required use of an untappable channel, ours only
carries the much more practical requirement of an anonymous channel.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/165
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