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Title:
Fault based cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard
Authors: J. Blöemer, J. -P. Seifert
Abstract:In this paper we describe several fault attacks on the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
First, using optical fault induction attacks as recently
publicly presented by Skorobogatov and Anderson \cite{SA}, we
present an implementation independent fault attack on AES.
This attack is able to determine the complete 128-bit
secret key of a sealed tamper-proof smartcard by
generating 128 faulty cipher texts.
Second, we present
several implementation-dependent fault attacks on AES.
These attacks
rely on the observation that due to the AES’s known timing analysis
vulnerability (as pointed out by Koeune and Quisquater \cite{KQ}),
any implementation of the AES must ensure a data independent timing
behavior for the so called AES’s {\tt xtime} operation. We present
fault attacks on AES based on various timing analysis resistant
implementations of the {\tt xtime}-operation.
Our strongest attack in this direction
uses a very liberal fault model and requires only 256 faulty
encryptions to determine a 128-bit key.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/075
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