[Resource Topic] 2001/056: On the Complexity of Matsui's Attack

Welcome to the resource topic for 2001/056

Title:
On the Complexity of Matsui’s Attack

Authors: P. Junod

Abstract:

Linear cryptanalysis remains the most powerful attack against DES
at this time. Given 2^{43} known plaintext-ciphertext pairs,
Matsui expected a complexity of less than 2^{43} DES evaluations
in 85% of the cases for recovering the key. In this paper, we
present a theoretical and experimental complexity analysis of this attack, which has been simulated 21 times using the idle
time of several computers. The experimental results suggest a complexity upper-bounded
by 2^{41} DES evaluations in 85% of the case, while more than the half of the experiments needed less than 2^{39} DES evaluations. In addition, we give a detailed theoretical analysis of the attack complexity.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/056

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