[Resource Topic] 2000/057: Session-Key Generation using Human Passwords Only

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Session-Key Generation using Human Passwords Only

Authors: Oded Goldreich, Yehuda Lindell


We present session-key generation protocols in a model where the
legitimate parties share {\em only} a human-memorizable
password, and there is no additional setup assumption in the
network. Our protocol is proven secure under the assumption that
trapdoor permutations exist. The security guarantee holds with
respect to probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries that control
the communication channel (between the parties), and may omit,
insert and modify messages at their choice. Loosely speaking, the
effect of such an adversary that attacks an execution of our
protocol is comparable to an attack in which an adversary is only
allowed to make a constant number of queries of the form ``is w
the password of Party A‘’. We stress that the result holds also
in case the passwords are selected at random from a small
dictionary so that it is feasible (for the adversary) to scan the
entire directory. We note that prior to our result, it was not
known whether or not such protocols were attainable without the
use of random oracles or additional setup assumptions.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/057

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